Chronicles 13
You can view the text of the full report, the questionnare and the database of respondents' responses in Russian in our repository on GitHub. If you need these files in English, please, write to us at web@chronicles.report.
Vladimir Putin's real support may be lower than people usually think — Chronicles research project
The Chronicles research project conducted a telephone survey among the adult population of Russia (over 18 years old) from September 10 to 17, 2024. The sample was stratified random (RDD) with 800 respondents, the maximum measurement error was 3.45% with a 95% confidence interval.
What's wrong with Putin's approval rating?
What does Vladimir Putin's approval rating mean? In electoral democracies with competitive media and elections, approval of politicians can mean a lot. But in Russia, the socio-political context is very different: competitive media are blocked and censored, election results are almost always pre-determined, and criticism of the leadership can lead to criminal prosecution. There is no clear explanation of what Putin's approval rating means. It is often implied that Putin's approval means support for current policies or a willingness to support any action taken by Vladimir Putin. Independent research project "Chronicles" has found that this is not the case. In fact, most people who say they approve of Putin do not support most of his actual actions.
Follow-up questions show that approval of Putin is not what it seems
We asked respondents a question about their approval of Vladimir Putin’s work using the Levada Center wording (“Do you generally approve or disapprove of Vladimir Putin’s work as president of Russia?”) and looked at how respondents who expressed approval of Vladimir Putin’s work answered questions about their support for his actual actions.
Vladimir Putin's actions that we chose:
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Confrontation with the West;
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Priority of foreign policy over domestic;
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"Special military operation".
“Our goal is not to dot all the i’s, but to demonstrate that the approval rating of Putin’s work is a much less unambiguous characteristic than some sociologists and citizens believe, and that expressing approval does not at all mean supporting a number of Putin’s key actions.
In addition, we asked respondents questions about who they voted for in the Russian presidential elections in March 2024, whether they admit that Vladimir Putin can make mistakes (or whether this is unlikely), and questions about sources of information”, comments the group of researchers of the Chronicles research project.
Wide and narrow groups of supporters
We have identified two fundamentally different groups of Vladimir Putin's supporters depending on how informed they are and their attitude towards a number of Putin's key factual actions.
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A narrow group of supporters: those who are informed and in solidarity with Vladimir Putin's foreign policy (14%). We included those respondents who simultaneously expressed approval of Putin's work, voted for him in the March 2024 presidential elections, are relatively informed (they chose YouTube or Telegram as their main sources of information), who declared their support for the SVO and did not express a desire to restore relations with Western countries.
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Wide group of supporters (52%): respondents who both expressed approval of Vladimir Putin's work and said that they voted for him in the March 2024 presidential elections.
It is worth mentioning that it is impossible to speak of any significant group of those who expressed solidarity with Vladimir Putin’s domestic policies: only 13% of those who expressed support for him did not express a desire for the main efforts to be concentrated on solving domestic socio-economic problems.
Respondents express approval of Putin, but many simultaneously want completely opposite things to what Putin does
We also studied which actions of the authorities, represented by President Vladimir Putin, correspond to the wishes of the Russian population.
Here is what respondents who expressed approval of Putin's activities want to happen within a year:
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To conclude a peace treaty with Ukraine with mutual concessions — 61%;
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To restore relations with Western countries — 43%;
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To focus main efforts on internal social and economic problems — 83%;
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To mobilize men to participate in the "special military operation"— 25%.
Thus, it is clear that although the majority of respondents (78%) express compliance with the normative position (i.e. approval of the actions of the country's leadership), the overwhelming majority of them want things that are directly opposite to the actual actions of Vladimir Putin, and respondents who expressed solidarity with Vladimir Putin's foreign policy course are a minority in the sample.
For comparison: respondents who do not approve of Putin's activities want:
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To conclude a peace treaty with Ukraine with mutual concessions — 79%;
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To restore relations with Western countries — 90%;
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To focus main efforts on internal social and economic problems — 92%
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To mobilize men to participate in the "special military operation" — 13%.
General economic situation of Russians
According to the latest sociological survey data, by the end of 2024, there has been an increase in the number of respondents who claim a decrease in their financial situation over the past year from 20% in April 2024 to 26% in September 2024. This can be explained by both seasonality and accelerating inflation. Researchers note that the share of respondents who say their financial situation has improved has fluctuated quite steadily in the range of 13-20% since the beginning of the war, and in the range of 15-18% over the past year.
At the same time, according to the data of the Chronicle project, until December 2023, the share of respondents reporting a decrease in their financial situation over the past year fluctuated in the range of 30–45% of the total number of respondents, and in 2024 this figure dropped to 20–25%.
The data collected shows that families experiencing a decline in their financial situation over the past year were 27% more likely to take out cash loans, microloans, and loans from relatives and friends in 2023-2024 compared to those who did not experience a decline in their financial situation. At the same time, if respondents took out loans in 2022 and 2023-2024, they were almost three times more likely to say that it became more difficult to repay loans if they experienced a decline in their financial situation (76.5%) compared to those who did not experience a decline in their financial situation (27%).
The dynamics of self-assessment of financial situation shows a decreasing trend of the poorest groups of the population for 2024 and, at the same time, some increase in the share of people with an average income.
A new trend is noted in the data of the 13th wave of the Chronicles, the researchers saw that civil servants were previously more loyal to the SVO than private sector workers. At the same time, a decrease in financial situation had the same effect in magnitude, reducing support for the SVO for both civil servants and private sector workers. In the 13th wave of the Chronicles data, civil servants ceased to be more loyal to the SVO in general, but a decrease in financial situation does not become a further driver of the decrease in their support for the SVO.
The same situation is with the willingness to vote for Putin (in comparison with the data of the 12th wave of the Chronicles). Civil servants were more often willing to vote for Putin, however, a decrease in the financial situation for both civil servants and private sector workers reduced the willingness to vote for Putin by 37.5%.
At the same time, a decrease in the financial situation of civil servants reduced real voting by only 7.2 percentage points, while for private sector workers this decrease was 14.8 percentage points. Similar patterns of connections were observed in the 13th wave of the Chronicles and in relation to support for Putin's activities and confidence in the infallibility of his activities. In general, a comparison of pre-election results on readiness to vote and real voting may indicate significant administrative pressure on civil servants during election week.
Влияние СВО на материальное положение россиян
и закредитованность
Согласно анализу данных на основе 13 волны, у участников СВО и членов их семей, самооценка материального положения их выше на 5% по сравнению с семьями респондентов, не участвующих в СВО. Также семьи участников СВО на 8% реже говорят об ухудшении материального положения.
“Стоит отметить, что эта разница между семьями участников СВО и прочими семьями стала статистически значимой только в 2024 году и стала особенно сильной в сентябре 2024. При этом, нельзя сказать, что семьи участников СВО говорят чаще об улучшении материального положения. Из этого можно сделать вывод, что военные деньги стали доходить до семей военных в 2024 году. Эти деньги поддерживают привычный уровень благосостояния, но нельзя сказать, что семьи участников СВО стали чувствовать себя финансово благополучнее. При этом надо оговориться, что сами участники СВО всегда говорили об улучшении материального положения, однако их число в опросной выборке не очень велико – около 2 – 2.5% от числа респондентов начиная с осени 2023 года” - считает исследовательская группа проекта “Хроники”.
Согласно данным опроса “Хроники” 13 волна семьи участников СВО не стали сберегать больше или меньше, чем семьи респондентов, не участвующих в СВО.
“Семьи участников СВО обычно на 50% чаще берут деньги взаймы у знакомых и родственников, на 8% чаще когда-либо в жизни брали кредиты, и на 13% чаще брали кредиты в 2022-2024 годах по сравнению с семьи респондентов, не участвующих в СВО. Мы также наблюдаем, что семьи участников СВО на 40,8% чаще берут авто. кредиты, по сравнению с семьями респондентов, не участвующих в СВО, в то время как привлечение ипотечных кредитов для этих семей статистически неотличимо” - уточняет исследовательская группа проекта “Хроники”.
Среди тех семей, которые брали кредиты в 2022 году и 2023-2024 годах, семьиучастников СВО на 24% чаще говорят, что в 2023-2024 годах стало сложнее выплачивать кредиты.
Таким образом несмотря на улучшающееся материальное положение у участников СВО и их семей, которое особенно проявилось в 2024 году, сберегать эти семьи чаще не стали. Эти семьи в целом характеризуются более частым использованием заемных средств, в особенно займов у родственников и знакомых. Семьи участников СВО стали больше брать автокредиты, но не ипотеки. При этом среди респондентов опросов Хроник, кто прибегал к кредитам как 2022, так и в 2023-2024 годах, семьи участников СВО чаще говорят о том, что кредиты стало платить сложнее. Последнее может быть связано с растущей ставкой по кредитам и большей закредитованностью семей участников СВО.“
Если рассматривать не просто номинальную поддержку СВО как меру лояльности, а более последовательную поддержку войны (декларируемая поддержка СВО и неготовность к перемирию), то традиционно (до 13 Хроник) госслужащие не являлись более лояльными сторонниками войны. Однако, при этом, экономические потрясения через снижение материального положения также не влияли на их позицию, в отличии от работников частного сектора” - комментируют исследователи проекта “Хроники”.
В целом у госслужащих реже наблюдается снижение материального положения. т.е. их мат. положение более стабильно. Однако в 13 волне “Хроник” мы видим изменившийся тренд. Госслужащие в целом стали менее последовательными сторонниками войны чем работники частного сектора, но при этомэкономические потрясения делают госслужащих более последовательными сторонниками войны.
При этом анализ мнения относительно целей участия добровольцев в СВО:Респонденты ощущающие снижение материального положения более прагматичны, чем те кто не испытывал снижения материального положения. Они чаще говорят, что в добровольцы идут ради материальных выгод. Семьи участников СВО более идейные, чем респонденты, не имеющие родственников на СВО. Семьи участников СВО чаще говорят, что в добровольцы идут ради выполнения гражданского долга.
Позиция госслужащих более центристская по этому вопрос, чем у работников частного сектора. Госслужащие реже говорят, что добровольцы идут исключительно ради денег, но не утверждают чаще, что идут ради выполнения гражданского долга.