If we compare the likelihood of events (the first and second options) and their desirability (the third option), it becomes obvious that there is a large gap between what kind of future people want and what they expect from both Putin's next term and from another candidate (although there is certainly a difference between the last two).

For all conditionally “positive” events that the majority of respondents consider desirable, Putin “loses” to the ideal candidate. This is logical: respondents have their own “ideal candidate,” one who is close in their assessment of the situation and vision of the country’s future. But on the issues of a truce, lifting sanctions and improving relations with Western countries, the differences between Putin and the ideal candidate are only a few percent — obviously, respondents understand that even an ideal candidate will find it difficult to solve these problems. Nevertheless, even ending the war with the achievement of the goals is expected from the ideal candidate more than from Putin.

It is worth noting that respondents with low incomes are more skeptical about the actions of the new president, be it Putin or a conventional ideal candidate. Their desires do not differ much from the desires of respondents with average and high incomes, while people with low income were more likely to talk about changing the focus on the country’s socio-economic problems and were more afraid of mobilization.

Overall, neither Putin nor the “ideal candidate” satiates voters’ demand for positive change in 2024-2025. Whoever wins the elections, respondents expect from him only what they least want — mobilization and increased budget spending on the army. On the one hand, this speaks of the pessimism of respondents, on the other, of a huge demand for changes, primarily to end the war and switch the focus from an aggressive foreign policy to solving internal problems and restoring relations with Western countries.